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These Briefings have been drafted by the Parliament Secretariat Task Force 
on the Intergovernmental Conference. Their purpose is to gather together, 
in an organized, summary form, the proposals and suggestions which the 
authorities in the Member States, the Union's institutions and specialist 
commentators have put forward on the issues likely to be on the IGC/96 
agenda. 
Briefings will be updated as negotiations proceed. 
Already out: 
1 The Court of Justice 
2 The Commission 
3 The Court of Auditors, ESC and COR 
4 Differentiated integration 
5 The common foreign and security policy 
6 The role of the national parliaments 
1 The hierarchy of Community acts 
8 Codecision procedure 
9 CJHA 
1 0 European citizenship 
11 WEU, security and defence 
12 Public services 
13 Social policy 
14 The European Parliament 
15 The European Council 
1 6 The Council of the European Union 
17 The budget and the IGC 
18 The IGC and transparency 
19 Subsidiarity and demarcation of responsibilities 
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BRIEFING 
ON 
SUBSIDIARITY AND DEMARCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
I. AGENDA FOR THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
Under the actual terms of the TEU, subsidiarity and demarcation of 
responsibilities are among the matters to be covered by the revision to be 
undertaken at the 1996 IGC. The stipulation to this effect derives specifically 
from: 
* Article B, which calls for a general review of policies and forms of 
cooperation 'with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and 
the institutions of the Community'; 
* the interinstitutional declaration on democracy, transparency and 
subsidiarity, adopted on 25 October 1993, the object of which is to implement 
the TEU in a democratic, open way. The declaration contains a clause whereby 
its substance may be revised if so requested by any of the signatory 
institutions. 
II. SOURCES 
* The European Parliament delivered its op1n1on in the report by Mr Bourlanges 
and Mr Martin on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view 
to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (adopted on 17 May 1995). 
In their initial working document (PE 213.065), the two rapporteurs working 
on the follow-up to the Bourlanges and Martin report, Mrs Raymonde Dury and 
Mrs Johanna Maij-Weggen, rule out detailed examination of issues related to 
the subsidiarity principle and powers and responsibilities. However, they 
do intend to be guided by the questionnaire compiled by Mr Westendorp for the 
Reflection Group. In that document, subsidiarity, powers, and 
responsibilities are considered with reference to the 'challenges, principles 
and objectives of the European Union' and the 'instruments at the disposal 
of the Union' . 
* The Commission states its views in its report on the operation of the TEU, 
adopted on 10 May 1995. 
* The Council's thinking is set out in its report on the functioning of the 
TEU, adopted on 10 April 1995. 
Among the Member States, the governments of Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Austria have taken a clear-cut official (or 
near-official) stand on subsidiarity, demarcation of responsibilities, and 
the hierarchy of Community acts. 
As regards the attitudes of the national parliaments and their component 
bodies concerned more directly with Community affairs, the Bonn COSAC meeting 
on 24 and 25 October 1994 discussed the views of the national parliaments and 
the European Parliament on the manner of giving effect to the subsidiarity 
principle. A number of national parliaments, including chambers composed of 
regional representatives, have also spoken out on the 1996 IGC and matters 
pertaining to subsidiarity, demarcation of responsibilities, and the 
hierarchy of Community acts. 
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In addition, political parties represented in the national parliaments have 
issued statements, drawn up reports, and delivered opinions. 
* The Committee of the Regions sets out its position in its opinion on the 
revision of the TEU, adopted on 20 April 1995. 
* The Reflection Group, formed by Foreign Ministry representatives from the 
Member States, one representative of the Commission President, and two 
European Parliament representatives, broached the subject of subsidiarity, 
demarcation of responsibilities, and the hierarchy of Community acts in 
connection with Item 8 (Instruments of the Union) of the agenda proposed for 
its first meeting (on 2 and 3 June 1995). 
The 'instruments' topic was or will be discussed by the Reflection Group on 
24 and 25 July, 3 and 4 October, and 13 and 14 November 1995. 
III. POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS AND STATEMENTS OF VIEWS 
A. European Parliament 
1. Bourlanges and Martin report 
(a) 
(b) 
As regards the vertical demarcation of responsibilities (between the EU 
and the Member States) 
'Clarifying competencies 
The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as currently 
la1d down in Article 3b of the Treaty, should be maintained and 
correctly applied. 
Establishment of a fixed list of EU and Member State competencies 
would be too rigid and too hard to achieve. Article 235 should be 
retained, but only used as a last resort and after assent of the 
EP. I 
' ... the reform of the Treaties requires institutionalization of 
the principle of the "necessary means"'. 
Powers and responsibilities of the Union 
'I. Objectives and policies of the Union 
The European Union will have to reinforce its existing 
framework of policies if it is to respond to economic and 
political change and to enhance its credibility in the eyes of its 
citizens. To do this it will have to develop new policies for the 
future and to strengthen its existing policies. Consolidation of 
this kind is conceivable only in the perspective of a merger of 
the three pillars and within a single institutional framework'. 
The EP is not advocating a direct transfer of powers in the fields 
of justice and home affairs. On the other hand, it is calling for 
the Community domain gradually to encompass: 
asylum policy 
policy as regards crossing the Member States' external borders 
policy as regards checks on movements across the Member States' 
external borders 
immigration policy 
policy in relation to third-country nationals 
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(c) 
policy on the fight against drug addiction 
policy to combat serious international crime. 
As regards the horizontal demarcation of responsibilities (i.e. in 
terms of the Community institutions) 
'The Treaty should provide for a separation between the provisions 
covering the Institutions and those covering the content of 
policies'. 
B. European Commission 
* Experience acquired in implementing the subsidiarity principle 
'In October 1992 it [the Commission] ... presented Parliament and the 
Council with its views on the effect to be given to the [subsidiarity] 
principle. It set out its view of the scope of the areas in which 
powers are shared, in accordance with the second paragraph of 
Article 3b, as distinct from the areas where the Union has exclusive 
powers. In December 1992 it went on to present the Edinburgh European 
Council with a list of items of legislation proposed or in force which 
it considered might be reviewed in the light of the subsidiarity 
principle. It was asked to report each year to Parliament and the 
European Council on the application of the principle.' (Commission 
report, p. 29) 
*The Commission's 'theoretical' approach 
(a) Subsidiarity implies a need to determine the decision-making tier 
on which each problem can be tackled most effectively, the possibilities 
ranging from local, regional, or national through to the European or 
world level. 
(b) By virtue of subsidiarity, the EU' s institutional system enables the 
Union, the Member States, and the regions to be brought into a balanced 
relationship. 
(c) The subsidiarity principle has added a new slant to a regular debate 
on demarcation of responsibilities and the reasons for issuing 
legislative acts. 
(d) The primary goal of the Intergovernmental Conference is not to 
increase the powers of the Union. 
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* Practical application of the theoretical approach 
(c) Each new Commission proposal is examined in advance in order to make sure that 
it accords with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
(d) In 1993 and 1994 the Commission reduced the number of its new proposals: 
1990: 185 
1991: 111 
1992: 89 
1993: 75 
1994: 51 
1995: 52 (according to the Commission's work programme for 1995). 
(e) The Commission has reviewed a number of existing acts and launched a programme 
to simplify current legislation. 
(f) The Commission has invoked the subsidiarity principle to withdraw several new 
proposals submitted to the Council and the European Parliament. 
(g) In its 1995 work programme, the Commission announced that the number of 
legislative proposals would be cut. 
* Shortcomings in the implementation of subsidiarity 
(h) Although the Union institutions have equipped themselves with the 
means of jointly giving effect to the subsidiarity principle, practical 
experience shows that difficulties arise: 
- in determining the place which subsidiarity should occupy in Community 
legislative procedures; 
- because the legislative texts adopted continue to be unduly detailed 
on account of the desire to protect the specific interests of particular 
groups. 
* Proposals to consolidate subsidiarity 
( i) The Commission is not proposing to make any alterations to 
Article 3b. 
(j) The Commission is not proposing to delete Article 235. 
* Powers and responsibilities of the Union 
(k) With regard to the Community sphere, the Commission is not proposing 
any new powers for the Union or that the vertical demarcation of 
responsibilities be reformed. 
( 1) The Commission is critical, however, of the demarcation as it 
affects the areas falling under Community responsibility on the one hand 
and those covered in Titles V and VI on the other1 • 
The Commission proposals described above are not couched in explicit terms, 
but rather can be inferred from the Commission's diagnosis of the 
imperfections currently affecting the operation of Titles v and VI. 
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C. Council 
* Assessment of the implementation of the subsidiarity principle 
(a) According to the Council report, the introduction of the 
subsidiarity principle is a useful means of enhancing the effectiveness 
of Community decision-making and bringing the Union closer to its 
citizens. 
(b) There is further room for improvement in the manner of giving 
practical effect to the principle: 
- Community legislation is in some cases still encumbered with an excess 
of detail; 
- subsidiarity is at times interpreted too sweepingly, and wrongly 
equated with deregulation, posing the risk that the acquis communautaire 
may be called into question. 
* Powers and responsibilities 
(c) The Council is not proposing to make any alterations to Article 3b. 
(d) The Council is not proposing to delete Article 235. 
(e) The Council is not proposing any new powers for the Union or that 
the vertical demarcation of responsibilities be reformed. 
D. Committee of the Regions 
* Proposed new wording of Article 3b 
(a) The Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only 
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States or regional or local authorities exercising the powers conferred on them 
under the national law of the Member States. 
* Implications of the new wording of Article 3b 
(b) The Committee of the Regions is calling for a right of appeal to the 
Court of Justice, whether to bring applications for annulment or to 
institute proceedings for failure to act. It is accordingly proposing 
to amend the third paragraph of Article 173: 
The Court shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions brought by the 
European Parliament, the ECB, or the Committee of the Regions for the purpose of protecting 
their prerogatives. It shall likewise have jurisdiction to rule on actions brought by the 
Committee of the Regions on account of a failure to observe the principle of subsidiarity. 
It shall also be competent to rule on actions brought by regions in cases where their 
legislative powers are affected by a regulation, directive, or decision. 
If, in the 'post-1996' situation, the Committee of the Regions does not 
become a genuine institution within the meaning of the Treaty, it is 
proposing that Article 175 be amended as follows: 
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Should the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission, in infringement of this 
Treaty, fail to act, the Member States, other inst1tutions of the Community, or the Committee 
of the Regions may bring an action before the Court of Justice to have the infringement 
established. 
(c) The Committee of the Regions wishes to work together with the 
Commission when the latter draws up the legislative programme or green 
and white papers and issues new legislation having a bearing on the 
powers of the regions and local authorities. 
* Proposal to clarify powers and responsibilities 
(c) The Committee of the Regions is proposing that the powers of the 
Union and the Member States be exactly clarified. It believes that 
their respective powers should be defined, but is not calling for them 
to be laid down in an itemized list. 
(d) The Committee is proposing that its right to be consulted be 
extended to include the following: 
all matters on which the ESC is consulted 
Article 130w (development policy) 
Article Be (policy with regard to citizenship of the Union) 
Article 94 (State aids). 
E. Member States 
Belgium 
1. Subsidiarity 
Bonn COSAC meeting (position of the delegation from the two Chambers of 
the Belgian Parliament): 
European Union directives are too detailed and specific, whereas the 
only obligation they should entail is that of achieving a result. 
According to Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, Belgium is willing to 
consider any proposal relating to implementation of the subsidiarity 
principle. However, he does not believe that changes or a reworking are 
genuinely called for at this point in time. 
As regards powers and responsibilities, Mr Dehaene, addressing a PPE 
Group conference, maintained that the legislative activity of the 
Community institutions should serve only to lay down fundamental 
principles and rules required to attain objectives connected with the 
general interest or the smooth running of the single market. 
Regarding the proposed lists of powers, he felt that any ad hoc, 
predetermined, and inflexible demarcation of responsibilities deriving 
from a list of powers should be rejected. 
The Prime Minister does not believe that Article 235 should be repealed 
or potential competence abolished. 
The own-initiative report of 30 March 1995, drawn up by Mr Eyskens on 
behalf of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, recommends that the 
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Denmark 
concept of subsidiarity be used with caution, given that some Member 
States perceive it as a means of removing the components of the acquis 
communautaire from the scope of Community control. It makes the point 
that the subsidiarity principle applies only in areas not falling within 
the Union's exclusive competence. 
The report expresses grave reservations about the idea of compiling 
lists of powers conferred on an exclusive basis and comes down against 
it because it would serve to undermine the Community framework and 
obstruct the continued development of the Union's responsibilities. 
Neither the Folketing nor the Government has yet agreed on a joint 
strategy. 
The Danish 'European Council', comprising Members of the Folketing, the 
European Parliament, various associations, and representatives of the 
two sides of industry, held a meeting in late November 1994, and reform 
of the Treaties was one of the items on the agenda. 
The Social Democrats are calling for a clear-cut definition of the 
subsidiarity principle and, as a means to that end, for a list of powers 
spec1fying the respective responsibilities of the Union, the Member 
States, and the regions. They maintain that social policy should not 
be the responsibility of the Union. 
The Conservative People's Party believes that the subsidiarity principle 
must be made one of the central topics at the 1996 IGC. More 
spec1flcally, the Conservatives are calling for the areas that it 
governs to be spel t out in more explicit detail. The powers and 
responsibilities of the Union and the Member States should be clarified. 
As far as that point is concerned, the Conservative view is that 
policies relating to health, education, the arts, and tourism should no 
longer be the subject of Community legislation. 
The Centre Democrats consider that the subsidiarity principle needs to 
be defined with greater rigour. To bring this about, they are calling 
for a clear-cut, explicit demarcation of the responsibilities falling 
to the Member States. the regions. and the Union, laid down on the basis 
of a list of powers. 
The SF (left-wing socialist party) feels that the definition of 
subsidiarity will have to be tightened up. The powers of the Union will 
need to be spelt out and made subject to the proviso that the action 
through which they are exercised must proceed on an international scale. 
To consolidate the subsidiarity principle, the Liberals are proposing 
that a list of powers be drawn up with the aim of determining which 
responsibilities should be exercised by the Union, the Member States, 
or regional and local authorities. 
Policies on social affairs, tourism, and the arts should cease to be 
covered in Community legislation. 
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Germany 
Bonn COSAC meeting (position of the German Bundesrat delegation) 
The Bundesrat notes that the subsidiarity principle removes the need for 
a good many Union acts, for instance in the fields of: 
- consumer protection 
- health 
- agrarian law 
- road transport. 
It is calling for a clear-cut demarcation of responsibilities between 
the Union and the Member States. 
It has compiled a list of Union provisions and proposals contrary to the 
subsidiarity principle. 
It is calling for the subsidiarity principle to be applied in areas 
falling within the Community's exclusive competence. 
Position of the Federal Government 
The Federal Government considers that the manner of giving effect to the 
subsidiarity principle will need to occupy a key place at the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference. 
At the Conference, the Government will continue to urge compliance with, 
and call for additions to, the 'subsidiarity list', the system whereby 
Union legislation in force will be examined in order to check that it 
is consistent with Article 3b of the Treaty and, where necessary, 
repealed. 
It will also endeavour to secure a clear-cut demarcation of tasks 
between the Union and the Member States. The coalition agreement cites 
tourism and disaster prevention/civilian rescue services as examples of 
areas in which a review is required in order to ascertain that existing 
Community powers are compatible with the subsidiarity principle. 
Mr Seiters, deputy leader of the CDU-CSU Bundestag Group, believes that 
improvement and rationalization of the subsidiarity principle will need 
to be brought to bear on the objectives of the Union and decision-making 
procedures. 
To clarify the meaning of Article 3b of the EC Treaty, the Government 
maintains that the burden of proof should be reversed by deleting the 
final words of the second paragraph, namely ' . • . and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community' . 
At the Reflection Group meeting held in Brussels on 24 and 25 July 1995, 
Mr Hoyer, a German member, proposed that a 'sunset clause' be inserted 
in the Treaty whereby 
- a Commission proposal would have to lapse if the Council failed to 
respond within the time-limits laid down and/or 
- a Community act would be declared null and void after a given expiry 
date. 
Position of the German Lander 
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The conclusions issued by the Ministers for European Affairs at the end 
of their conferences on 16 February and 24 May 1995 call for the 
following: 
Article 3b, second paragraph (new wording) 
The Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle 
of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States or regional and local authorities on which powers have been 
conferred by the national law of the Member States. 
clear-cut, explicit demarcation of responsibilities between the EU 
and the Member States 
In future, the Union should act only by virtue of expressly 
defined responsibilities. The list of the EU's objectives, at 
present couched in very vague terms, should be replaced by a list 
of specific powers, divided up according to fields of activity. 
Opting for a half-way house between a list of objectives and a 
list of powers, it might be possible to draw up a list of tasks 
referring to the specific rules laid down in the Treaty as regards 
the exercise of powers. 
The Lander are thus proposing that Article 3 be rephrased, the 
introductory clause reading as follows: 
Without prejudice to Article 3b and in accordance with the powers 
conferred on it by this Treaty, the Community shall be entrusted 
with tasks in the following areas: 
and that the first paragraph of Article 3b be amended to read: 
The Community shall act solely within the limits of the powers 
expressly conferred on it by this Treaty. 
The Lander have compiled a proposed list of powers to be exercised 
by the Union on an exclusive, non-exclusive, or additional basis. 
Deletion of the words 'energy' and 'tourism' in Article 3(t). 
A new definition of the principle of fair cooperation (Article 5): 
1. deleting the final sentence, 
2. inserting the following second and third sentences: 
In exercising its powers, the Community shall likewise take 
account of the interests and internal systems of the Member 
States. The Community and the Member States shall be required to 
engage in fair cooperation. 
The Committee of the Regions must be given an independent right of 
appeal (Berlin, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, and Schleswig-Holstein 
are opposed to this) . Consultation must be made mandatory 
(especially with respect to the environment, vocational training, 
and the advent of the information society), and the Committee must 
acquire its own organizational machinery. 
Bavaria, Baden-Wlirttemberg, and Hesse are calling for Article 235 
of the EC Treaty to be deleted. 
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Greece 
Spain 
Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg are proposing that a Subsidiarity 
Chamber be set up within the Court of Justice, consisting of the 
Court of Justice judges and one constitutional court judge from 
each Member State. 
Views of the political parties 
SPD: Mrs Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, SPD Vice-President and 
spokesman on European affairs, is proposing that Article 235 be 
deleted. 
Liberals: the Liberals are calling for: 
a clear-cut system for assigning powers to the Union on the 
one hand and to national and regional decision-making bodies 
on the other, 
a list of powers covering the key spheres of Union activity, 
including external trade, agricultural and fisheries policy, 
competition policy, completion of the internal market, 
monetary union, and international-scale environmental and 
transport policy. 
Alliance '90/The Greens 
The Greens claim to be opposed to a list of 
Moreover, they believe that Article 3b should 
unchanged. 
powers. 
remain 
The Greek Government maintains that the subsidiarity principle should 
be enforced in a more systematic way. 
With regard to the powers and responsibilities of the Union, it is 
calling for: 
more effective policies to guarantee the safety of workers, 
a more effective equal opportunities policy, 
a more effective health policy, for example where drugs and Aids 
are concerned, 
a more effective policy to protect consumers' rights, 
a genuine industrial policy, 
energy and disaster prevention policies established on a formal 
footing. 
A Spanish government document submitted to the country's Parliament sets 
out a specific, accurately defined view on reform of the subsidiarity 
principle. 
The Spanish Government considers that inclusion of an Article 3b on the 
subsidiarity principle was contrary to the Spanish proposals. 
Regarding the 1996 IGC, it is not advocating a list of powers or 
deletion of Article 235. 
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France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Bonn COSAC meeting (position of the French Senate delegation) 
The delegation feels that, in general, there are too many rules and 
regulations. It is proposing that a body formed by representatives of 
the national parliaments be made responsible for monitoring compliance 
with subsidiarity (see the background report of 12 November 1992 on the 
subsidiarity principle, drawn up on behalf of the Senate Delegation for 
the European Communities by Mr Michel Poniatowski). 
The Senate and the National Assembly are calling for subsidiarity to be 
applied in areas falling within the Community's exclusive competence. 
The former Minister for European Affairs, Mr Alain Lamassoure, believes 
that the 1996 IGC will need to produce an itemized list of powers, 
couched in consistent, specific terms and based on the subsidiarity 
principle. 
The President of the Republic, Mr Jacques Chirac, considers that the 
national parliaments should be entitled to 'demur on the grounds of 
subsidiarity', enabling them to have a say in the process of framing 
Union legislation. 
The Social Democratic Centre Party is calling for a hierarchy of acts 
to be introduced, modelled on Articles 34 to 37 of the French 
Constitution. The party believes that such a step would put an end to 
the present disorder as regards legislation by distinguishing between 
framework laws, laying down the fundamental principles and essential 
rules of Union policies, regulations, for which the Council would be 
solely responsible, and implementing texts, which, in accordance with 
the subsidiarity principle, would be the responsibility of the Member 
States. Indeed, Member States should be entitled to appeal directly to 
the Court of Justice whenever the Treaties were infringed in that 
connection. 
Neither the Irish Government nor the Irish Parliament has spoken to date 
on the question of powers and responsibilities and the manner of giving 
effect to the subsidiarity principle. 
Bonn COSAC meeting 
The delegation from the Chamber of Deputies maintains that the 
subsidiarity principle reflects the desire to coordinate national law 
and Community rules more closely, without seeking to weaken the European 
Union. The principle applies to areas in which Community and national 
bodies have concurrent competence. However, it should be understood in 
a broader sense, as a yardstick for allocating powers to the different 
standard-setting tiers. 
The memorandum of 12 October 1994 drawn up by the former Foreign 
Minister, Mr Martino, notes that the IGC will need to work out a clear 
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definition of standard-setting instruments and a hierarchy of 
legislative acts. 
Luxembourg 
Bonn COSAC meeting 
The Chamber of Deputies delegation considers that there are too many 
Community rules and regulations relating, for example, to public 
contracts or finance or stemming from the propensity to alter the own 
resources system. 
Implementation of the subsidiarity principle should be supervised by the 
national parliaments and the European Parliament. 
Speaking on 16 February 1995, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Poos, 
observed that the subsidiarity principle needed to be translated into 
action to ensure that the Union could gain the support of the public at 
large. 
He proposes that the tasks of the Union and the means/measures to be 
employed to accomplish them should be made a more prominent focus of 
attention. 
The official view of the Luxembourg Government (Agence Europe, 
6 July 1995) is that the subsidiarity principle should be enforced 
systematically. The Government sees no need to provide for new powers 
in the TEU. 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Bonn COSAC meeting 
The Eerste Kamer delegation believes that the subsidiarity principle 
could shackle the Commission's right of initiative and even give rise 
to abuses. That being the case, it is necessary to determine the 
criteria that would allow or require proposals for Regulations or 
Directives to be withdrawn or revised. The Eerste Kamer rejects the 
proposal (from the German Bundesrat delegation) to apply the 
subsidiarity principle in areas falling within the Community's exclusive 
competence, since to do so could jeopardize Community machinery and 
policies, needlessly bolster the tendency to pursue bilateral action, 
and undermine the Commission's right of initiative. 
The Netherlands Government maintains that the IGC should concentrate on 
the smooth running of the internal market. It is accordingly calling 
for a substantial degree of deregulation and consolidation of the 
subsidiarity principle. Without spelling out practical proposals, it 
is urging that Community legislation be made clearer and more 
comprehensible. 
Bonn COSAC meeting 
The delegation from the Assembleia da RepUblica considers that there is 
a plethora of legislation in fields having a strong impact on budgetary 
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Austria 
policy. On the other hand, there are not enough Community rules in 
areas entailing relatively low Community expenditure. 
The subsidiarity principle must not, under any circumstances, impede the 
work of the Community or be interpreted a priori. 
With regard to the proposal (from the German Bundesrat delegation) for 
the subsidiarity principle to be applied in areas falling within the 
Community's exclusive competence, the Portuguese Parliament feels that 
the principle could enable adjustments to be made in the areas concerned 
and, in some cases, provide grounds for certain policies to be returned 
to national control. 
Whereas the Portuguese Government has yet to state an official view on 
the 1996 IGC, the country's Parliament studied the implementation of the 
subsidiarity principle at length in February 1995, in its report on the 
parliamentary response to the revision of the Treaty on European Union 
at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. The document notes that the 
concept of subsidiarity does not just relate to the balance between the 
Community and the Member States, but on the contrary, it also has to do 
with the role of the citizen and society vis-a-vis the State, as 
referred to in Article A of the Treaty. To that extent, it could even 
constitute a first step towards clarification, in a Community for which 
it is difficult to find defining theoretical models. 
The subsidiarity principle has been invoked on numerous occasions by way 
of an apology for devotion to national sovereignty or with the aim of 
accentuating regional idiosyncrasies. It has been invoked to obstruct 
the development of common policies. 
However, the principle is linked to the idea of effectiveness and, as 
such, aust never be used to call the nature of Community action into 
question, since to do so would be tantamount to distortion. 
In addit1on, the document produced by the Portuguese Parliament 
discusses how implementation of the subsidiarity principle should be 
monitored. 
Leaving aside the three-way advance checks by the Commission, the 
Council, and the European Parliament (under the interinstitutional 
agreement on procedures for implementing the principle of subsidiarity, 
which entered into force at the same time as the TEU), the Portuguese 
Parliament believes that the national parliaments would be qualified to 
exercise political scrutiny. However, it does not say which 
parliamentary assemblies would be in the most suitable position to do 
so. 
The 'guidelines' on the 1996 IGC, published by the Austrian Government 
in April or May 1995 (the document is undated), state that the 
subsidiarity principle must be strictly enforced. The principle is 
regarded as a means of apportioning tasks more efficiently to each 
different level, be it European, national, or regional. 
The Government considers a possible future hierarchy of acts to be a 
matter of some interest. However, the institutions of the Union will 
need to be brought into the appropriate balance. 
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Finland 
Sweden 
Generally speaking, the Government believes that environmental policy 
and the fight against unemployment should constitute priorities for the 
Community. As regards creating new powers for the Union, it feels that: 
- existing measures in the field of energy would benefit if the 
Community were given a degree of responsibility for energy policy, 
- the TEU should lay down Community responsibilities for policy on 
disaster prevention and emergency action, 
- it will not be necessary to confer powers on the Community with 
respect to tourism policy. 
In its statement to Parliament on 14 February 1995, the Finnish 
Government maintained that the subsidiarity principle should be enforced 
rigorously and with care. 
It is calling for existing secondary legislation to be reviewed, 
modernized, and simplified. 
The Swedish Government believes that the subsidiarity principle will be one 
of the main items on the agenda for the 1996 IGC. In this connection it is 
calling for a right of initiative to be granted to the European Parliament 
with respect to Union legislative acts. 
At the end of a joint hearing organized by the Swedish Government and 
Parliament on 22 and 23 May 1995, the Government appointed an ad hoc 
committee, the Swedish Parliamentary Committee on the 1996 IGC, which will 
deal with implementation of the subsidiarity principle. 
United Kingdom 
Bonn COSAC meeting 
The British parliamentary delegation maintained that not only the number 
of European regulations, but also European law as such, which was often 
perceived as a diktat or a form of interference, was giving rise to very 
widespread anxieties extending beyond individual sectors. Generally 
speaking, the subsidiarity principle had been welcomed in the United 
Kingdom, although there were still considerable doubts as to its 
effectiveness in practice. 
The two parliamentary committees specializing in European affairs have 
expressed misgivings about various proposals for Directives drawn up by 
the Commission. 
The House of Lords European Communi ties Committee believes that the 
subsidiarity principle should apply in areas falling within the 
Community's exclusive competence. 
According to Mr Davis, the British junior Minister responsible for 
European affairs, the subsidiarity principle implies that action should 
be taken at Union level if, and only if, better results can be obtained 
jointly than by each country in isolation, and even when that is the 
case, inopportune authoritarianism has to be avoided (Le Monde, 
14 June 1995). 
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In the same article, Mr Davis put forward some ideas as to how the 
subsidiarity principle might be reformed. 
One option to which he referred was that of strengthening the provisions 
of the Treaty by inserting an additional reference, the wording of which 
has already been agreed in Council. Alternatively, the national 
parliaments could be given the right to demur on the grounds of 
subsidiarity. 
Mr Davis said that the United Kingdom was willing to consider all 
possible means of achieving the above ends. 
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F. Conclusions 
1. The subsidiarity principle and implementation of Article 3b 
Amendment Yes No Suggestions 
EP X 
Commission X Continue to simplify 
existing legislation 
and clarify the role 
of subsidiarity in 
legislative 
procedures 
Counci 1 X Clarify the role of 
subsidiarity to 
prevent it posing a 
challenge to the 
acquis communautaire 
COR X Reword Articles 3b, 
173, third 
paragraph, and 175 
TEC 
Belgium X 
Denmark xl 
Germany X The Government is 
proposing to reword 
the final part of 
Article 3b, second 
paragraph. 
The Lander are 
proposing to reword 
Article 3b and to 
rephrase Article 5 
accordingly. 
Greece X Enforce the 
subsidiarity 
principle more 
systematically 
Spain X 
With the exception of the Liberals, all Danish political parties are calling 
for the subsidiarity principle to be spelt out, clarified, and defined more 
accurately. 
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Amendment Yes No Suggestions 
France X In October 1994 the 
Senate called for 
the subsidiarity 
principle to be 
extended to cover 
areas falling within 
the Community's 
exclusive competence 
Italy X 
Luxembourg X 
Netherlands X The Government -is 
calling for the 
subsidiarity 
principle to be 
strengthened 
Portugal X 
Austria X Rigorous enforcement 
of the subsidiarity 
principle 
Finland X Rigorous enforcement 
of the subsidiarity 
principle 
Sweden X Right of initiative 
for the EP 
United Kingdom X In October 1994 the 
House of Lords 
called for the 
subsidiarity 
principle to be 
extended to cover 
areas falling within 
the Community's 
exclusive competence 
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2. Vertical demarcation of powers conferred on the Union, the Member 
States, and the regions/Lists of powers 
The following favour vertical demarcation of powers by means of: 
EP: 
Commission: 
Counci 1: 
COR: 
Belgium: 
Denmark: 
Germany: 
Federal 
Government: 
Lander: 
Greece: 
Spain: 
France: 
Italy: 
Luxembourg: 
Netherlands: 
Portugal: 
Austria: 
Finland: 
Sweden: 
United Kingdom: 
hierarchy of acts incorporating an 'implementing acts' category 
harmonization of the areas encompassed within the Community domain with 
those covered in Titles V and VI 
no 
clear-cut demarcation of responsibilities between the Union and the 
Member States 
no 
list of the respective powers of the Union, the Member States, and the 
regions 
clear-cut demarcation of tasks between the Union and the Member States 
list of expressly defined powers 
no 
no 
itemized list of powers, 
hierarchy of acts, distinguishing between framework laws and 
implementing acts 
hierarchy of acts, distinguishing between laws and regulations 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
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3. Article 235 and potential competence 
The following: advocate are opposed to repeal of Article 235 
EP 
Commission 
Council 
COR 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany: 
X 
X 
X 
Government 
Lander 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
x (Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg, Hesse) 
X 
United Kingdom 
DOC_EN\DV\283\283726 - 21 - PE 165.560 
4. Proposals to 'curtail' the Union's responsibilities 
EP 
Commission 
Council 
COR 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Government 
Minder 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
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5. Proposals for new (or wider) responsibilities for the Union, excluding 
Titles V and VI (see Briefings on these subjects) 
EP Social policy, Equal opportunities, Energy, CAP, 
Fisheries, Environment, Consumers, Transport, Tourism, 
Public services, Education, Training, Youth, External 
economic relations 
Commission 
Council 
COR 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Social policy 
Safety of workers, Equal opportunities, Health, 
Consumers, Industry, Energy, Disaster prevention 
Energy, Disaster prevention 
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